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Commerce Clause Challenges to the
Endangered Species Act: The
Rehnquist Court's Web of Confusion
Traps More Than the Fly
By DAVID W. ScoPP*
Only within the moment represented by the present century has one species-
man-acquired significant power to alter the nature of (our) world.
-Rachel Carson1
WITHIN THE NEAR future, the Supreme Court may declare the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA" or "Act") unconstitutional. 2 Under
the Court's current analysis, congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause3 is limited to regulating economic activities that have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce. 4 Because the ESA is a
comprehensive statute regulating both economic and non-economic
activities, circuit courts have been forced to apply inconsistent reason-
ing, while still finding the statute constitutional. This discrepancy begs
the question of whether the Court's current Commerce Clause juris-
prudence effectively addresses statutes that regulate both economic
and non-economic objects.
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has struggled to find
an interpretive model that can properly determine the scope of Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 5 Between 1887 and
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1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 5 (Houghton Mifflin 1962).
2. SeeJud Mathews, Turning the Endangered Species Act Inside Out?, 113 YALE LJ. 947,
948 (2003) (contending that in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the lower courts'
justifications for upholding the ESA are tenuous).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ("The Congress shall have power .. . [t]o regulate
commerce . . . among the several states.").
4. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000).
5. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2003).
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1937 the Supreme Court maintained that Congress only had the au-
thority to regulate local activities that "directly" affected interstate
commerce. 6 Eventually, this framework buckled under the pressure of
FDR's need to confront the Depression with legislation designed to
stabilize the economy.7 The Supreme Court recognized that the for-
malistic test failed to provide consistent results or properly correlate
to a statute's impact on interstate commerce. 8 Consequently, the
Court developed the substantial effects test,9 a deferential analysis that
looked to a statute's attenuated affect on interstate commerce to de-
termine its constitutionality. 10
Despite the previous failure of the categorical limitations to con-
gressional authority, the Supreme Court resuscitated its attempt to
provide categorical limitations to congressional authority in United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison (collectively "Lopez-Morri-
son"), abandoning sixty years of precedent under the more deferential
substantial effects test.'1 In establishing the Lopez-Morrison framework,
the Court replaced the previous "direct"/"indirect" categorical dis-
tinction with an "economic"/"non-economic" distinction. It all but de-
clared that Congress does not have authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate objects with no "economic" value. 12 In doing so,
the Court implicitly assumed that "non-economic" objects cannot im-
pact interstate commerce."3 Through this rigid approach, the Rehn-
quist Court attempted to provide a workable framework for limiting
congressional authority to the regulation of activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 14 Further, the Rehnquist Court attempted
to use the requirement that the object of the regulation be "eco-
nomic" to provide this limitation. This sea change was not without its
detractors. Justice Souter emphasized in his Morrison dissent that the
6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1, 16 (1895).
7. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 642 (Souter, J., dissenting); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 120 (1942).
8. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937).
10. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 607-19 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting).
12. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
13. Id.
14. JOHN T. NOONAN, NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 128-30 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002).
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Court's previous experimentation with categorical exemptions proved
unworkable.15
Indeed, environmental statutes, such as the ESA, expose the limi-
tations of the Lopez-Morrison framework. In enacting the ESA, Con-
gress intended to conserve entire ecosystems through the preservation
of listed endangered species. 16 While many of these listed species are
isolated to one state and have no "economic" value, 17 their protection
is essential to the delicate balance of our ecosystems.18 Furthermore,
Congress comprehended the national economic effects of preserving
biodiversity. 19 Thus, there is tension between a statute that must regu-
late intrastate, "non-economic" activities in order to attain a broader
goal that impacts interstate commerce and an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause that assumes that "non-economic" activities cannot
affect interstate commerce.
Despite this tension, or perhaps because of it, the Supreme Court
has not directly addressed whether the ESA violates congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the Act has remained
unscathed in the circuit courts; the Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
have each upheld the constitutionality of the ESA against Commerce
Clause challenges. 20 Yet each court has developed vastly different and
sometimes conflicting rationales for doing so as they struggle to har-
monize the ESA with the Lopez-Morrison framework.
This Comment contends that Commerce Clause challenges to
the ESA expose the failure of the Rehnquist Court to accomplish its
own goals with the Lopez-Morrison analysis. The Court's formalistic reli-
ance on the "economic"/"non-economic" distinction is not workable
and does not correlate to a statute's effect on interstate commerce.
Moreover, any attempt to cure the incomprehensibility of Lopez-Morri-
15. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
16. See NOONAN, supra note 14, at 128-30.
17. Michael C. Blumm & George Kimbrell, Symposium Article: Flies, Spiders, Toads,
Wolves, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take Provision, 34 LEwis & CLARK
ENVTL. L.J. 309, 327 (2004).
18. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders ("NAHB") v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lo-
pez: A Misstep, but Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J.
33, 79 (1996)).
19. 16 U.S.C. §1531(a)(3) (2001) (noting that "these species of fish, wildlife, and
plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value
to the Nations and its people").
20. See, e.g., NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041; GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th
Cir. 2003); Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Bab-
bitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
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son would further limit its ability to properly determine when a statute
affects interstate commerce. Thus, if the Supreme Court grants certio-
rari in a case challenging the constitutionality of the ESA under the
Commerce Clause, it should abandon the question of whether the ob-
ject of the regulation is "economic" and return to the more practical
question of whether the ESA substantially affects interstate commerce.
Part I explores the history of the interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. The section begins by introducing two judicial models of Com-
merce Clause interpretation: formalism and judicial deference. 21 It
then details the reasons for the rise and fall of the formalistic "di-
rect"/"indirect" effects test.2 2 After nearly sixty years of judicial defer-
ence under the substantial effects test,23 the Rehnquist Court
returned to a formalistic approach by requiring that the object of the
regulation be "economic."24 The Court attempts to use this "eco-
nomic" distinction to provide a workable framework and to determine
when a statute affects interstate commerce.2 5 The section asserts that
because the categorical distinction of the "direct"/"indirect" effects
failed to meet these asserted goals it is fair to ask whether the Rehn-
quist Court can address these failures.26
Part II answers this question in the negative, contending that
Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA demonstrate that the Lopez-
Morrison framework has not successfully addressed the failures of the
"direct"/"indirect" effects test. First, the circuit courts have created
incoherent results, as they have not consistently identified the proper
object of the regulation. 27 Furthermore, this inconsistency is the result
of an unworkable test rather than any failures of the circuit courts.
Second, the Lopez-Morrison test fails to recognize the real, substantial
effects of the ESA on interstate commerce. Thus, the "economic" dis-
tinction does not properly correlate to the goal of the Commerce
Clause.
Part III contends that attempts to cure the confusion in the cir-
cuits within the Lopez-Morrison framework would take the test further
away from the goals of the Commerce Clause. Categorical exemptions
21. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569, 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22. See id. at 570.
23. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 642 (Souter, J., dissenting); Wickard v Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 120 (1942).
24. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
25. See NOONAN, supra note 14, at 128-30.
26. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
27. See generally cases cited supra note 20.
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are inherently imprecise 28 and difficult to apply,29 and any attempt to
solve this problem would create more questions. This Comment con-
cludes that if the Court considers a Commerce Clause challenge to
the ESA, it must abandon the question of whether a particular species
or activity is "economic" and instead focus on whether the statute as a
whole substantially affects interstate commerce.
I. Connerce Clause Interpretation: Recycling History in
Search of a Workable Doctrine
The federal government justifies much of its legislation as sup-
ported by the Commerce Clause. Since it is often Congress's most ef-
fective and far-reaching legislative tool it has provided the Court with
such fits throughout the country's history-alternatively restricting,
then expanding its reach.
In the face of congressional attempts to regulate an increasingly
industrialized economy, the Supreme Court implemented the "di-
rect"/"indirect" effects test, which attempted to determine a statute's
constitutionality by drawing a categorical distinction between those
that had a direct or indirect impact on interstate commerce. The
Court abandoned that approach during the 1930s in favor of the
more deferential "substantial effects" test. After sixty years of judicial
deference, the Rehnquist Court returned to a categorical approach in
a renewed attempt to provide a workable judicial test that parallels the
goals of the Commerce Clause. Considering this is a return to a cate-
gorical analysis similar to the one that the Court had previously aban-
doned, in order to be successful, the new test must resolve the failures
of the "direct"/"indirect" effect test.
A. Two Competing Theories of Commerce Clause Interpretation
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce... among the several
States." 30 The history of the Supreme Court's struggle to interpret
these six words has proven tumultuous. 3 1 In this struggle, the Su-
preme Court has attempted to provide a doctrine that is both worka-
ble and able to account for the complexities of a society that has
28. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
COMMERCE CLAUSESpring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
evolved from a simple agrarian economy to an industrialized, inter-
connected one.3 2
Two conflicting theories of jurisprudence have competed to pro-
vide guidelines for determining the constitutional limits on congres-
sional authority: formalism and practical deference. 33
Proponents of formalism, those supporting the "direct"/"indi-
rect" effects test and the Lopez-Morrison framework, purport that the
Supreme Court should use formal rules to provide judicial restrictions
on congressional authority.3 4 These formal rules must both create
comprehensible results3 5 and honor the original intent of the Com-
merce Clause-to limit congressional authority to regulating inter-
state commerce. 36 Formalists contend that without categorical
enclaves, Congress would have unlimited authority, as any activity may
affect interstate commerce in a causal manner.3 7 Thus, the Court's
deferential approach renders the Commerce Clause meaningless.
In contrast, the opposing perspective, practical deference, which
underlies the Court's substantial effects jurisprudence, allows for a
broader recognition of congressional authority by focusing on
whether a statute actually affects interstate commerce.38 This view of
jurisprudence purports that categorical exclusions are difficult to
work with and therefore create incomprehensible results. 39 Further-
more, the theory recognizes that local or "non-economic" activities
may impact interstate commerce. Consequently, categorical exclu-
32. See generally id. at 568-74.
33. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
34. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("One approach the Court
used to inquire into the lawfulness of state authority was to draw content-based or subject-
matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic or formalistic categories those activities that
were commerce and those that were not.").
35. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pimt. L. REv. 1, 6 (1983).
36. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 45 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
37. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.6 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)). The Morrison majority stated:
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is
communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the
center. A society such as ours "is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors
throughout its territory; the only question is their size."
Id.; see also SCALIA, supra note 36, at 44-47.
38. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 604-07 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
39. See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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sions may not correlate to an activity's actual effects on interstate
commerce. 40
Finally, this perspective holds that the Court should defer to Con-
gress because it has a greater institutional capacity than nine
unelected individuals to determine when a statute relates to interstate
commerce.4 1 The more fluid approach of Congress is better equipped
to make subtle judgments about precisely how much a federal statute
will or will not affect interstate commerce. 42 Furthermore, Congress
has a superior ability to gather empirical findings and studies in an
attempt to make these complicated determinations. 43
These two competing theories mark the development of the
Court's Commerce Clause doctrine, addressed below. The formalists
dominated the "direct"/"indirect" test, followed by sixty years of prac-
tical deference, which the Rehnquist Court recently abandoned in a
return to formalism. The inability of either theory to properly address
practical limitations has contributed to the Court's shifting approach
to the Commerce Clause throughout the last two hundred years.
B. The Rise and Fall of the "Direct"/"Indirect" Effects Test: The
Court's Categorical Analysis Fails
During the rapid industrial development of the late nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court perceived a need to simultaneously limit
the reach of legislative authority and provide lower courts with a
framework to coherently interpret the constitutionality of statutes.44
Thus, the Court developed the categorical "direct"/"indirect" effects
test.45 Under this test, Congress had the authority to regulate local
activities that "directly" affected interstate commerce but did not have
the authority to regulate local activities that "indirectly" affected inter-
state commerce. 46
This attempt at clarity failed, however, as the country moved from
industrialization into the Depression. The Court's theory of categori-
cal analysis did not translate into the practical implementation of lim-
iting federal law. Indeed, lower courts were not harmoniously
40. Id. at 625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 616-18.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 569-70, 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Morrison, 529 U.S. at (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
45. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569.
46. Id. at 570.
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interpreting statutes' constitutionality, and as a result the Court aban-
doned the test.
1. The Rise of the "Direct"/"Indirect" Effects Test
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 4 7 which initiated the "direct"/"in-
direct" effects test, made the rigid distinction between manufacturing
and commerce. 48 In doing this, the Court hoped to create a clear
framework for lower courts while staying true to the purpose of the
Commerce Clause by limiting federal power.49 In E. C. Knight, the Su-
preme Court faced the question of whether Congress had the author-
ity to use the Sherman Antitrust Act to regulate a manufacturer's
domination over the nation's sugar refining capacity.50 The Court
held that Congress could not regulate manufacturing because it was
not "commerce" and merely had an "indirect" effect on interstate
commerce. 51 The Court reasoned that the effects were "indirect" be-
cause Congress merely intended to prevent private gain from monop-
olistic manufacturing of sugar, rather than through the control of
interstate commerce.52 The Court expressed fear that extending con-
gressional authority to such "indirect" effects would include all activi-
ties and effectively obliterate state sovereignty.53
The Court again emphasized the importance of the "direct"/"in-
direct" test in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,54 in which it
struck down regulations of fixed hours and wages of employees of an
intrastate business because employment conditions only applied to in-
terstate commerce "indirectly."55 Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the
Court, viewed labor conditions as an issue of local management and
any consequential effects on prices was "indirect."56 Furthermore, the
Court characterized the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" ef-
fects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce as "a funda-
mental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional
47. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id. at 16.
54. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
55. Id. at 550.
56. Id. at 549.
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system."5 7 Indeed, the Court saw this categorical distinction as essen-
tial in providing effective limits to congressional authority. 58
2. The Supreme Court Abandons the Categorical Approach: The
Rise of the Substantial Effects Test
Eventually, confronted with the judicial crisis of 1937,59 the Court
abandoned its formalistic test. In marked contrast, the Court adopted
the deferential substantial effects test, which considered the actual ef-
fects of an activity on interstate commerce. 60
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,6 1 the Court commenced
its departure from the "direct"/"indirect" distinction by upholding
Congress's authority to regulate unlawful labor practices under the
National Labor Relations Act. 62 The Court recognized that the test
created idle distinctions, which failed to measure remote, yet cata-
strophic, effects. 6 3 Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court that
[w]e are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national
life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in
an intellectual vacuum. Because there may be but indirect and re-
mote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host
of local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that
other industrial activities do not have such a close and intimate
relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of indus-
trial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern. 64
Thus, the Court took a more realistic approach and recognized that
merely because local activities may have remote, "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce does not preclude the fact that industrial activi-
ties can have real effects on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
reasoned that because the industries had organized on a national
57. Id. at 548.
58. Id. at 546.
59. During the judicial Crisis of 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt confronted the
Supreme Court's expansion of power by threatening to appoint justices whom shared his
ideologies. In addition to the theoretical failures of the categorical approach, this political
confrontation contributed to the Court's adoption of the more deferential model. See Al-
pheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791, 796 (1952);
Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv.
645, 677 (1946).
60. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 642 (2000) (Souter, J. dissenting); Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
61. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id.
COMMERCE CLAUSESpring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
scale, strife among workers threatened productivity in a particular
plant, which affected the entire nation's supply of a vital resource. 65
In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, the Court expanded congres-
sional authority to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 66 Thus, the Court created the foundation of what has be-
come the current test, stating Congress may regulate (1) the channels
of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce; or (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 67
In Wickard v. Filburn,68 the Court created the "aggregation princi-
ple," in an attempt to create a test that could recognize real effects on
interstate commerce.69 The Court upheld the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, reasoning that, while one farmer's consumption of home-
grown wheat had a negligible effect on interstate commerce, the
aggregate effects of several farmers consuming their own wheat would
lower the demand for national wheat.70 This decreased demand sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. 71 Justice Jackson explained the
rationale for adopting the deferential approach by asserting, "The
Court's recognition of the relevance of the economic effects in the
application of the Commerce Clause exemplified by this statement
has made the mechanical application of legal formulas no longer
feasible." 72
The Court abandoned the "direct"/"indirect" effects test in these
cases because of a realization that the test was unworkable and did not
correlate to the goal of the Commerce Clause. 73 In his Morrison dis-
sent, Justice Souter noted this failure, writing that "history has shown
that categorical exclusions have proven. . unworkable in practice. '74
Furthermore, the NLRB Court recognized that categorical distinctions
cannot recognize actual impacts on interstate commerce. 75 Due to the
complexity of modern economics, the categorical enclaves may not
comprehend a real effect on interstate commerce and, alternatively,
may see a connection when one does not exist.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 37.
67. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995); Jones & Laughlin Stee4 301
U.S. at 36.
68. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
69. Id. at 127-29.
70. Id. at 128-29.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 123.
73. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640, 644 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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For sixty years the Court followed the substantial effects test. It
did so in reaction to the failings of the categorical test that preceded
it. Nevertheless, beginning in 1995, the Court once again abandoned
precedent and altered the Court's holding in Jones by narrowing the
analysis of those activities "that substantially affect interstate com-
merce," thus creating the Lopez-Morrison analysis. 76
C. Lopez-Morrison: The Rehnquist Court Revisits the Principles of
the "Direct"/"Indirect" Effects Test
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court returned to the princi-
ples of the "direct"/"indirect" effects test, once again using categorical
enclaves to limit congressional authority.7 7 It did so by establishing a
framework for analyzing the third prong of the test developed in
NLRB-thus formalizing the "substantial effect" on interstate com-
merce analysis. This time the Court attempted to provide effective
bounds to the Commerce Clause by focusing on the "economic" na-
ture of the regulated activity. 78 Therefore, as Justice Souter contends,
"it seems fair to ask whether the step taken by the [Lopez] Court...
does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence
from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago. '7 9 Accord-
ingly, to be successful, the Lopez-Morrison test must not make the same
mistakes. It must create coherent results and must successfully corre-
late to a statute's impact on interstate commerce.
1. The Rehnquist Court Attempts to Use a Categorical Approach
to Provide a Workable Framework
a. The "Economic" Nature of the Regulated Activity Is Central
In Lopez, the Rehnquist Court returned to a categorical approach.
The Court faced the question of whether the Commerce Clause gave
Congress the power to use the Gun Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA")
to regulate gun possession near a school.80 Since the regulation of
gun possession near a school constituted neither a regulation of a
channel of interstate commerce nor a regulation of an instrumentality
of interstate commerce, the statute's constitutionality depended upon
whether it substantially affected interstate commerce.81 The sharply
76. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 557, 559-61; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607, 613.
79. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 551-52.
81. Id. at 558-59.
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divided Court held that Congress exceeded its power under the Com-
merce Clause because possession of a gun near a school did not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.8 2 The Court presented four
factors for determining whether a statute substantially affects inter-
state commerce: (1) whether the object of the regulation is "eco-
nomic" in nature; (2) whether the statute contains a nexus to
interstate commerce; (3) whether congressional findings show a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce; and (4) whether the substan-
tial effects on interstate commerce are too attenuated.8 3
In striking down the GFSZA, the Rehnquist Court emphasized
the first factor, which it perceived as the "non-economic" nature of
gun possession in a school zone.8 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
that the regulation of gun possession "has nothing to do with 'com-
merce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms. '85 Although the Court did not resolve
whether the "non-economic" status of an activity completely prohib-
ited congressional oversight, the "non-economic" characterization
nonetheless played a major role in the Court's determination that gun
possession did not substantially affect interstate commerce.8 6 Thus,
considering subsequent case law, while on the surface the Lopez-Morri-
son framework only explicitly limits the traditional deferential ap-
proach, in reality it constitutes a return to the categorical approach.
Five years later in Morrison, the Court reemphasized the impor-
tance of the "economic" classification of the regulated activity. In Mor-
rison, the Court faced the question of whether the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA") regulated activity that substantially affected in-
terstate commerce.87 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "a fair read-
ing of Lopez shows that the non-economic, criminal nature of the
conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case. s88 Applying
this principle, the Court reasoned that gender motivated crimes are
not "economic" and therefore may not be aggregated to show an ef-
fect on interstate commerce.8 9 Again, Chief Justice Rehnquist was
clever with respect to the threshold nature of the "economic" charac-
terization. The Chief Justice wrote, "While we need not adopt a cate-
82. Id. at 567.
83. See id. at 559-68.
84. See id. at 567.
85. Id. at 561.
86. Id. at 561, 567.
87. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602-07 (2000).
88. Id. at 610.
89. See id. at 617.
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gorical rule against aggregating the effects of non-economic activity in
order to decide these cases, thus far ... our cases have upheld Com-
merce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature."90 Thus, the factor is central but not necessarily
dispositive. This creates a strong potential for confusion in the lower
courts.
b. The "Economic" Requirement Forces the Identification of the
Precise Object of the Regulation
By emphasizing the importance of the "economic" nature of the
regulation, the Lopez-Morrison analysis has forced lower courts faced
with ESA challenges to precisely identify the object or activity of the
regulation. Indeed, it seems intuitive that a court cannot resolve
whether an object or activity is "economic" or "non-economic" with-
out identifying what that object or activity is.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers9 1 ("SWANCC") solidified the importance of identifying the
precise object of the regulation. The Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether Congress had authority to protect intrastate wet-
lands that provided habitats for migratory birds from the development
of a municipal landfill. 92 In SWANCC, the Court could have viewed the
precise object of the regulation as the development of the landfill or,
alternatively, as the protection of the wetlands.93 In dicta, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist reasoned that a court must identify the precise object of
the regulation to answer the questions raised by the substantial effects
analysis.94 The Court, however, avoided identifying the precise object
of the regulation evading the constitutional issue and holding that the
wetlands in question was beyond the scope of the Clean Water Act.
95
Furthermore, the Court failed to give any guidance on how to identify
the precise object.9 6
90. Id. at 613.
91. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
92. Id. at 166.
93. See id. at 173.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 174.
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2. The Rehnquist Court Attempts to Use the "Economic"/"Non-
economic" Distinction to Limit the Commerce Clause
Doctrine to Interstate Commerce
The Rehnquist Court attempts to use the "economic" require-
ment as a proxy to distinguish between activities that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce and those that do not.97 If a regulated
intrastate activity is determined to be "economic," it can be aggre-
gated to show substantial effects on interstate commerce.9 8 If the activ-
ity is not "economic," however, it may not be aggregated, and any
effects on interstate commerce are, therefore, too attenuated.99 Im-
plicit in this requirement is a belief that limiting the Commerce
Clause to "economic" activities will somehow limit the Commerce
Clause to interstate commerce. Unfortunately, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist never explained how the economic character of an activity inher-
ently alters the degree or substantiality of its impact on interstate
commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist has merely argued that the Court
has never upheld the regulation of a "non-economic" activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. 100
H. The Lopez-Morrison Framework Does Not Accomplish Its
Own Goals
The Court has returned to a categorical approach-similar to the
one that failed under the pressures of the Depression. The Court's
previous experience with a categorical approach to the Commerce
Clause proved unworkable and did not correlate to a statute's affect
on interstate commerce, yet the Court has returned to a similar ap-
proach. As Justice Souter presciently asked in his Lopez concurrence,
can the Court's current approach overcome the failures that doomed
the "direct"/"indirect" effects test?101
As applied to the ESA, the answer is a resounding no. The Lopez-
Morrison test has not overcome the previous failures of the "direct"/
"indirect" effects test. The Court has not created clarity for the lower
97. See NOONAN, supra note 14, at 128-30.
98. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
99. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. Though Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not create a per se rule, some scholars believe that he did so in effect. See Allan Ides,
Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason in United States v. Morrison,
18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 566-67 (2001).
100. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
101. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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courts, as circuit courts have not consistently identified the proper ob-
ject of ESA. These incoherent results reflect the failures of the Rehn-
quist Court's test, rather than any failure in the application of the test.
Furthermore, the test does not successfully correlate to the statute's
impact on interstate commerce; the "economic"/"non-economic" dis-
tinction fails to capture the ESA's real effects on interstate commerce.
A. Commerce Clause Challenges to the ESA Demonstrate the
Incomprehensibility of the Lopez-Morrison Analysis
One of the primary goals of the Lopez-Morrison framework is to
create a workable system for lower courts to interpret Commerce
Clause challenges to statutes.'0 2 In other words, the Lopez-Morrison
analysis must produce coherent results from any possible fact pattern.
Under Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA, however, the circuit
courts have not been able to coherently or consistently identify the
particular object of the regulation that must be "economic." This des-
ignation has led to incoherent results. Moreover, this confusion repre-
sents the failures of the Lopez-Morrison framework, rather than the
failures of the circuit courts' application-and therefore demon-
strates that the framework is incomprehensible.
1. The Circuit Courts Have Inconsistently Identified the Proper
Object of the Regulation: the Conduct, the Individual
Target, or the Comprehensive Goal
Because the Lopez-Morrison analysis hinges upon the determina-
tion of whether the object of the regulation is "economic," lower
courts must first identify the object that is being regulated. Under
Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA, the circuits have inconsis-
tently defined the proper object as the conduct, the individual target,
or the comprehensive goal.
The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit view the proper object of
the ESA as the human conduct taking the species ("conduct ap-
proach").103 For example, under the conduct approach, the commer-
cial development that destroys a critical habitat would be the object of
the ESA. However, this approach has not been fully accepted; the
102. See NOONAN, supra note 14, at 128-30.
103. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Gibbs v.
Babbit, 214 F.3d 482, 495 (4th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that landowners, who consider the
red wolf a menace, kill them in an effort to protect their livestock which has commercial
value).
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Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the conduct approach in GDF Realty
Investors, Ltd. v. Norton ("GDF') .104
Additionally, the object of the regulation could also be defined as
the target of the regulation. There are two separate ways to define the
target of the regulation. First, as the Fourth Circuit held in Gibbs v.
Babbit,10 5 the target of the regulation could be viewed as the loss of the
individual species ("individual target approach"). Second, the target
could be the effect that losing a species has on the comprehensive
goal of preserving biodiversity ("comprehensive approach") as the
D.C. Circuit did in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt
("NAHB") 106 and the Fifth Circuit did in GDF. 0 7 Even within the com-
prehensive purpose approach, the circuits cannot reach a consensus
as to why preserving biodiversity affects interstate commerce. Judge
Wald's majority opinion in NAHB provides that the preservation of
biodiversity substantially affects interstate commerce through its pro-
tection of potential pharmaceuticals. 10 8 On the other hand, NAHB
and GDF both reasoned that preserving biodiversity substantially af-
fects interstate commerce through its effects on the health of
ecosystems.109
a. The NAHB Court Adopts Both the Conduct Approach and the
Comprehensive Approach
NAHB demonstrates the confusion that a single court may have in
applying the Lopez-Morrison"0 framework."' The D.C. Circuit ad-
dressed the question of whether Congress could protect the purely
intrastate, "non-economic" Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly ("Delhi
Fly") from the development of a hospital and roadway. 112 Considering
the three approaches outlined above, the court could have taken one
104. 326 F.3d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 2003).
105. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
106. 130 F.3d 1041, 1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
107. GDFRealty, 326 F.3d at 640-41.
108. NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Congress contem-
plated that listed species may contain actual medicines and that these medicines could
provide templates for the multibillions pharmaceutical industry to synthesize prescription
drugs. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973); GARY WATTS ET AL., THE ENDANGERED SPE-
CIES AcT AND CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION: AN INTEGRATED BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
APPROACH, IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SOCIETY 191-92 (Apr. 1997).
109. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640-41.
110. NAHB was decided before Morrison. Nevertheless, for matters of clarity, the Com-
ment refers to the Lopez-Morrison test when referring to its impact on NAHB.
111. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1041.
112. See id. at 1043, 1046.
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of three paths. Under the conduct approach, the object of the regula-
tion would have been the development of the hospital and the road-
way. Under the individual target approach, the object of the
regulation would have been the Delhi Fly. Finally, under the compre-
hensive approach, the object of the regulation would have been the
effect of the loss of the Delhi Fly on biodiversity. While the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the ESA, the two affirming judges and the dissenting
judge applied significantly different reasoning. 113
None of the judges attempted to adopt the individual target ap-
proach, since the Delhi Fly arguably does not fit the Rehnquist
Court's view of the term "economic" and is completely isolated to Cali-
fornia. 11 4 The court reached this conclusion despite the important
niche that the Delhi Fly plays in its habitat; it pollinates flowers, which
other species depend upon. 115 Nonetheless, under the Lopez-Morrison
analysis, the Delhi Fly may not be aggregated to show a substantial
effect on interstate commerce because it is an intrastate "non-eco-
nomic" object. Consequently, it is likely that the Rehnquist Court
would find that regulating the Delhi Fly violates the Commerce
Clause.
In the majority opinion, Judge Wald reasoned that the provision
was constitutional based on two of the Lopez-Morrison categories; it
constituted proper congressional control over the channels of inter-
state commerce"16 and it substantially affected interstate com-
merce."i 7 Judge Wald relied on two justifications for holding that the
ESA provision substantially affects interstate commerce. First, she
adopted the comprehensive approach, arguing that in the aggregate
the listed species contain genetic diversity and therefore may have po-
tential commercial medicinal value."" Second, she reasoned that the
Act substantially affects interstate commerce by preventing states from
lowering environmental regulations in an attempt to attract industry,
113. Id. at 1052 n.10.
114. Id. at 1067 (Sentelle,J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1043-44; G. TYLER MILLER, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: WORKING WITH THE
EARTH 64 (Thomson Learning, 10th ed. 2004).
116. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 17, at 329. No circuit,
however, has applied the channels of interstate commerce category to an ESA case since
NAHB.
117. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052.
118. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit later adopted the comprehensive approach in GDF
Realty, it rejected Judge Wald's aggregation of listed species rationale and instead empha-
sized the effect of biodiversity on the health of ecosystems. See generally GDF Realty Invs.,
Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2003). This reasoning mirrors Judge Hender-
son's concurrence in NAHB. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058-60 (Henderson, J., concurring).
Spring 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
a phenomenon known as the race to the bottom. 119 This race to the
bottom rationale expands the conduct approach to include prevent-
ing destructive state policy, rather than merely private conduct that
threatens protected species.
Judge Henderson's concurring opinion joined the majority's
comprehensive approach but asserted different reasons for its substan-
tial effects upon interstate commerce. While Judge Wald relied upon
the potential medical benefits of all listed species, Judge Henderson
relied upon the effects of a healthy ecosystem on interstate com-
merce.120 She reasoned that the potential commercial effects of undis-
covered medicines are too attenuated to satisfy the substantial effects
test.' 21 Instead, she contended that because of the interconnectedness
of species and ecosystems, the loss of one species affects land and ob-
jects that are involved in interstate commerce.122 Thus, the protection
of a purely intrastate species substantially affects interstate
commerce.
123
In addition to the comprehensive purpose argument, Judge Hen-
derson relied upon the conduct approach; the commercial develop-
ment that was potentially going to destroy the Delhi Fly constituted
the object of the regulation.' 24 Since the commercial land develop-
ment was clearly "economic," Judge Henderson's opinion reasoned
that the conduct could be aggregated to show a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 125 As explained below, although the D.C. Circuit
did not adopt this approach in its majority opinion in NAHB, it later
adopted it in Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton.126
In his NAHB dissent, Judge Sentelle relied on the individual tar-
get approach to conclude that the protection of the Delhi Fly violated
the Commerce Clause. 127 He reasoned that Congress may not protect
the Delhi Fly because it is a "non-economic" object.128 In reaching this
conclusion, Judge Sentelle rejected Judge Wald's comprehensive ap-
proach for failing all of the Lopez factors: an ecosystem is not com-
119. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052. The race to the bottom occurs when states attempt to
attract industry by lowering the costs of business through minimizing environmental regu-
lations. Id. at 1054-57.
120. Id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1059-60 (Henderson, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
127. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1067 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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merce, 129 the statute contained no jurisdictional limit,130 and the
reasoning had no logical stopping point. 13 1 He also rejected Judge
Henderson's conduct approach, reasoning that it would contradict Lo-
pez by providing no effective bounds to congressional authority and
allow the regulation of "non-economic" activities where the regulation
substantially affects interstate commerce.132
b. The Rancho Viejo and GDF Courts Adopt Conflicting Reasoning
The 2003 decisions in Rancho Viejo and GDFfurther illustrate that
applying the Lopez-Morrison framework has confused different circuit
courts. 133 Although Rancho Viejo and GDFboth upheld the ESA against
Commerce Clause challenges within a week of each other, each circuit
used strikingly conflicting reasoning. 3 4 In choosing the object of the
regulation, the Rancho Viejo court upheld the ESA based on the con-
duct approach, 135 while the GDF court upheld the ESA based on the
comprehensive approach. 36
In Rancho Viejo the D.C. Circuit addressed the question of
whether the Commerce Clause gave Congress authority to protect the
intrastate, "non-economic" arroyo toad from a residential develop-
ment.' 37 Under the conduct approach, the object of the regulation
would have been the residential development. Under the individual
target approach, the object of the regulation would have been the
arroyo toad. Finally, under the comprehensive approach, the object of
the regulation would have been the effects of the loss of the arroyo
toads on Congress's goal of preserving biodiversity.
The D.C. Circuit upheld the ESA based on the conduct ap-
proach, determining that the regulated activity was the planned resi-
dential development, rather than the arroyo toad that it
threatened.' 38 The court reasoned that conduct could serve as the ob-
ject of the regulation because Congress had contemplated protecting
endangered species by regulating the development of land. 1 9 The
129. However, this is debatable based on one's definition of commerce.
130. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1064-65 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1067 (SentelleJ., dissenting).
133. See generally Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF
Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2003).
134. See generally Rancho Vie'o, 323 F.3d 1062; GDF Realty, 326 F.3d 622.
135. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062.
136. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640-41.
137. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1064.
138. Id. at 1072.
139. Id. at 1072-73.
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court further found that regulating the residential development sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce because it required workers
and materials from other states. 140
Significantly, the conduct approach may not, however, com-
pletely protect against constitutional challenges to the ESA. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Ginsburg emphasized that the conduct ap-
proach is limited to commercial conduct, which eliminates ESA pro-
tection for a species that is threatened by a lone hiker or landscaping
homeowner. 1 4 1
As though addressing its opinion atJudge Ginsburg's Rancho Viejo
opinion, the Fifth Circuit refuted the conduct argument in GDF, stat-
ing that while the effect of the ESA may be to sometimes prohibit
commercial development, Congress is not directly regulating develop-
ment.142 The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the Commerce Clause
provided Congress the authority to protect invertebrate cave species
from a commercial development. 143 In rejecting the conduct ap-
proach, the court reasoned that there is a distinction between the act
of taking and the purpose of taking, and the ESA prohibits taking a
species through any conduct, rather than specifically through com-
mercial development. 44 Furthermore, the conduct reasoning would
lead to inconsistent results; it "would allow application of otherwise
unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to non-com-
mercial actors.' 45 Finally, the conduct approach would lead to virtu-
ally unlimited authority under the Commerce Clause, which would
obliterate its limiting purpose. 1 46
Instead, the GDF court relied on Judge Henderson's NAHB con-
currence that employed the comprehensive approach in upholding
the ESA.147 The court reasoned that a noncommercial, intrastate activ-
ity (the loss of cave species) was essential to the ESA's overall eco-
nomic regulatory scheme, since allowing piecemeal extinctions
threatens the interdependent web of all species and therefore under-
mines the ESA's essential purpose of protecting ecosystems. 148 In-
deed, the GDF court went beyond Judge Henderson's concurring
140. Id. at 1069.
141. Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
142. See GDFRealty, 326 F.3d at 633.
143. Id. at 624.
144. Id. at 633.
145. Id. at 634.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 640-41.
148. Id. at 640.
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opinion in NAHB, providing evidence of the importance of ecosystem
health and balance. 149 Endangered species perform critical "ecosys-
tem services" such as decomposing organic matter, renewing soil, miti-
gating floods, purifying air and water, or partially stabilizing climatic
variations. 150
The Fifth Circuit rejected the individual target approach, how-
ever, stating that cave species, themselves, do not have a significant
effect on interstate commerce. 151 The court reasoned that the scien-
tific interest generated by the species and their possible future "eco-
nomic" benefits was either negligible or too hypothetical to satisfy the
Morrison requirement that there must be a close link between an intra-
state activity and its effect on interstate commerce. 152 Thus, with its
rejection of the conduct approach and its approval of the comprehen-
sive approach, the Fifth Circuit in GDFemployed starkly different rea-
soning than the D.C. Circuit in NAHB in upholding the ESA's
constitutionality.
c. Gibbs v. Babbitt Relied on Both the Individual Target and the
Conduct Approaches
In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress could prevent
ranchers from shooting red wolves.1 53 In contrast to the D.C. and Fifth
Circuits, the Fourth Circuit upheld the ESA based on the individual
target approach; red wolves affect interstate commerce in the aggre-
gate, since they create value in tourism, scientific research, and the
pelt trading industry.154 This approach, though sufficient on the par-
ticular facts of Gibbs, cannot apply to "non-economic," intrastate spe-
cies, such as the Delhi Fly or cave species, since they do not fit the
Rehnquist Court's definition of "economic" and therefore cannot be
aggregated. The Fourth Circuit also endorsed the conduct approach
by reasoning that landowners, who consider the red wolf a menace,
kill1 5 5 them in an effort to protect their livestock.1 56 Since, the con-
149. Judge Sentelle's dissent in NAHB criticized Judge Henderson's concurrence be-
cause it did not explain how the health of ecosystems significantly affects interstate com-
merce. See NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
150. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640; see John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the
Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1164-65 (2001) (discussing
role of many commercially insignificant species in achieving ecosystem survival).
151. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 637.
152. Id.
153. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-93 (2000).
154. See id. at 494-95.
155. "Species takes" is the term of art that refers to the killing of an endangered or
listed species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (2001). Section 4 of the ESA does not allow anyone
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duct of killing the species is "economic" in nature, it can be aggre-
gated to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 157
As GDF departed from NAHB, Gibbs employs different reasoning
than other courts that have addressed the ESA's constitutionality.
Where Lopez-Morrison places importance on identifying an object as
"economic," the various courts attempting to follow the dictates of the
Court's decisions are unable to do just that which the Rehnquist
Court believes is the first step in Commerce Clause analysis.
2. The Incoherent Results Reflect the Incomprehensibility of the
Lopez-Morrison Analysis Rather Than Any Failures of the
Circuit Courts
Since defining the object of the regulation is essential to deter-
mining whether or not it is "economic," lower courts need guidance
in making this determination. Furthermore, because of the centrality
of the "economic" requirement, a precise definition of the word "eco-
nomic" seems essential. Finally, since, the definition of "economic"
probably determines which analytic approaches to the object regu-
lated by the ESA would survive, it likely influences how a court sees
the proper object. It is the Rehnquist Court's failure to resolve these
issues that causes such confusion in the lower courts. 158
a. The Rehnquist Court Failed to Give Proper Guidelines for
Determining the Proper Object of the Regulation
Although the resolution of the proper object of the regulation is
essential to determining whether that object is "economic" or not,
neither Lopez nor Morrison discussed the issue. Furthermore, SWANCC
mandated this requirement, but did not give any guidelines for deter-
mining the proper object.159 The determination of this question is
crucial because it significantly affects the scope of the ESA under the
Commerce Clause.
If the proper object of the regulation were the conduct that de-
stroys the species, any species could be regulated under the ESA, as
long as the conduct is "economic." Therefore, the Delhi Fly would be
to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, trap, capture, or collect or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct." Id.
156. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495.
157. Id. at 493.
158. See Mathews, supra note 2, at 948.
159. See Solid Waste Agency of No. Cook County ("SWANCC") v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
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protected from a hospital development in NAHB, the arroyo toad
would be protected from the residential development in Rancho Viejo,
the cave species would be protected from the commercial develop-
ment in GDF, and the red wolves would be protected from the ranch-
ers shooting them in an attempt to protect their ranches in Gibbs.
Nonetheless, no species, regardless of any "economic" value, would be
protected from a "non-economic" activity, such as a landscaping
homeowner or an off-road vehicle.
Under the individual target approach, only the red wolves would
survive, since none of the other species have a measurable "economic"
value. The red wolves have an "economic" value in the aggregate
through their effects on tourism, pelt trading, and science.
Finally, under the comprehensive purpose approach, the ESA
would survive a Commerce Clause challenge as applied to any listed
species or any activity. This is rational because the listing process en-
sures that congressional authority is limited to those species that are
endangered or threatened and thus are necessary to the preservation
of biodiversity.
b. The Court's Failure to Defime the Scope of "Economic"
Contributed to the Confusion of the Circuit Courts
Unfortunately, neither Lopez nor Morrison gave any guidance in
defining "economic" activity. Rather, the Court's conclusions rest on
the assumption that gun possession and gender-based violence are
unarguably "non-economic."1 60 The distinction, however, is not that
simple. The word "economic" could be seen as the allocation of re-
sources, where money is a claim on resources. 161 This view may in-
clude activities such as housework because it involves the cost of
working for an extended period of time and the benefits of a clean
house.162
Perhaps, the Court meant to limit the question to "commercial"
activity, which is more limited and would only include the creation or
exchange of services. 163 In Lopez, for example, the Court used the two
words interchangeably.1 64 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court has not clearly
given lower courts guidance and has, in essence, applied the "I know it
160. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); Ides, supra note 99, at 567.
161. See RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (4th ed. 1992).
162. Id.
163. See Ides, supra note 99, at 570-71.
164. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
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when I see it" standard. 165 The Court's definition probably lies some-
where between the broad definition and the more narrow "commer-
cial" definition. 1
66
This distinction is significant because it affects which approaches
to the proper object would be upheld as constitutional under Com-
merce Clause challenges to the ESA. Undoubtedly, the definition of
"economic" influences how a court views the proper object of the reg-
ulation. Under a broad "economic" definition the individual ap-
proach may survive a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA, since
even the killing of a "non-economic" species would be a form or re-
source allocation. Under the more narrow view of "economic," how-
ever, the ESA would only protect popular, "economic" species, such as
the red wolf, and would not protect the majority of the listed species.
Thus, the ESA would be completely ineffectual. On the other hand,
under the "commerce" view, only the conduct approach survives,
since it is the only approach that encompasses the creation or ex-
change of services. By creating a shopping center, a developer is liter-
ally creating a forum for consumption as well as relying upon workers
and supplies in the development process. Surely, this is "commerce"
under even the narrowest view. It is still unclear whether either view of
"economic" would include the comprehensive approach, thus contrib-
uting to the confusion in the circuits.
c. The Rehnquist Court Fails to Clarify the Significance of the
Essential Part of a Larger Economic Regulation
Exception
One way in which the regulated activity may be seen as "eco-
nomic" is when a noncommercial activity is fundamentally important
to a larger economic regulation.1 67 The Supreme Court, however, has
not properly resolved whether this remains an exception. 68 Lopez im-
plied that a federal regulation of noncommercial activities does not
violate the Commerce Clause if the intrastate, noncommercial activi-
ties were "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activ-
ity."1 6 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist nonetheless dismissed the VAWA as
not being "a larger regulation of economic activity" without much
analysis, thus leaving the lower courts with no guidelines as to the
165. Ides, supra note 99, at 574.
166. Id.
167. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640-41 (5th Cir. 2003).
168. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
169. Id. at 610.
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boundaries of this possible exception. 170 Moreover, Morrison does not
discuss whether the essential part of a larger regulation of "economic"
activity argument may be presented, thus making its viability even less
clear.1 71 Finally, SWANCC emphasized the vulnerability of the Clean
Water Act's application to intrastate, noncommercial wetlands even
though the overall purpose of the Clean Water Act is to preserve navi-
gable waterways, which provides a jurisdictional restriction to "eco-
nomic" activity. 172 Therefore, it remains unclear whether this "larger
regulation of economic activity" exception still applies, and if it does,
the boundaries remain unclear.
The unresolved issue of whether a noncommercial activity's "es-
sential importance to a larger economic regulation" can satisfy the
substantial effects test is dispositive as to whether the GDFcourt's com-
prehensive approach is tenable. The court aggregated the extinction
of species ("non-economic" activities) to create an impact on ecosys-
tems (which substantially affects interstate commerce). 173 Without the
exception, the GDF court seems to have violated the Lopez-Morrison's
essential dogma of not aggregating a "non-economic" activity.
Because the Rehnquist Court has failed to provide a framework
that the circuit courts can coherently apply, the Lopez-Morrison frame-
work is incomprehensible. Beyond this incomprehensibility, Lopez-
Morrison fails to achieve its own goals as it regulates statutes in a man-
ner inconsistent with the intent of the Commerce Clause.
B. As Applied to the ESA, the Critical "Economic" Requirement
Does Not Correlate to a Regulated Activity's Effect on
Interstate Commerce
The ESA has real impacts on the interstate economy. The Lopez-
Morrison analysis, however, fails to recognize these effects when ap-
plied to an intrastate, "non-economic" species. 174 Therefore, the test
fails to correlate to the goal of the Commerce Clause.
170. Id.
171. Cf id.
172. See generally SWANCC v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
173. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640-41.
174. See Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Endangered Species: Does the ESA Encroach
on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv.
723, 754 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, Protecting Intrastate Endangered Species] (suggesting that
Morrison and SWANCC raise serious questions as to Congress's authority to regulate intra-
state species with little current economic value); Lilly Santaniello, Commerce Clause Chal-
lenges to the Endangered Species Act's Regulation of Intrastate Species on Private Land, 10 HASTINGS
W.- Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 39, 41 (2003).
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1. The ESA Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
Congress enacted the ESA with the intent of preserving individ-
ual species in order to protect biodiversity. 175 Congress compre-
hended that protecting biodiversity would, in turn, substantially affect
interstate commerce. 176 Indeed, empirical studies confirm that pre-
serving biodiversity does, in fact, affect interstate commerce.
a. Congress Comprehended the Necessity of Protecting Individual
Species in Order to Protect Entire Ecosystems
Protecting an individual species is essential to Congress' compre-
hensive goal of preserving biodiversity. Ecologists recognize that spe-
cies are interconnected and that the loss of one species can affect
biodiversity, which affects entire ecosystems. 177 Each species performs
an ecological niche, or role, in its habitat, and other species depend
upon the performance of this niche for their survival.1 78
The food chain represents one potential relationship between
species; each species acts as a source of food for the next. 179 For exam-
ple, a hawk may eat a robin, which consumed caterpillars that ate
leaves.18 0 Decomposers consume the remains of the leaf, caterpillar,
robin, and hawk after they each die.18 1 Thus, the protection of each of
these species is essential to the survival of the others.
The Delhi Fly in NAHB provides another example of an individ-
ual species whose protection is essential to the preservation of bi-
odiversity. Many plant species depend upon insects, such as the Delhi
Fly, to pollinate their flowers.182 Moreover, humans and other animals
depend upon plants for food, either by eating them or by eating ani-
mals that consume them. 183 In essence, without pollinating insects,
very few vegetables would be available for humans or other species to
consume.1 8 4 In fact, if all insects disappeared today, most of the
earth's animals would become extinct within a year because of the
175. NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J., concur-
ring) ("Congress recognized the interconnection of the various species and the ecosys-
tems."); MILLER, supra note 115, at 98.
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2001).
177. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Johnson, supra note
18, at 79).
178. MILLER, supra note 115, at 98.
179. Id. at 76.
180. Id. at 75.
181. Id.
182. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1043-44; MILLER, supra note 115, at 64.
183. MILLER, supra note 115, at 64.
184. Id.
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disappearance of so much plant life. 185 Even less alarmist results
would surely affect interstate commerce to a significant degree.
The ESA's listing process of endangered species shows that Con-
gress comprehended the interconnectedness of all species and recog-
nized that the protection of each listed species is essential to the
overall goal of preserving biodiversity. Section 4 of the ESA186 pro-
vides that the Secretary of the Interior must ascertain which species
are endangered or threatened and designate critical habitats when
necessary. 187 Sections 4(b)(1) and 4(b)(2) provide that the Secre-
tary's decision must be based solely on the best scientific and commer-
cial data available.1 88 Indeed, the Secretary may not consider the
economic impact of protecting a species in the listing process, 189
which indicates that Congress was aware of the economic impact of
the ESA and directed the Secretary of the Interior to disregard those
impacts.
This is unusual and relatively extreme for an environmental stat-
ute,19 ° which begs the question: why did Congress not want the Secre-
tary to consider the economic effects of listing one species? The
answer lies in the complexity of the problem. When narrowly viewing
the loss of one species, such as a sand fly, it may appear that the eco-
nomic losses of restricting commercial development may outweigh the
benefits of protecting the species. Congress, however, understood that
each listed species is essential to biodiversity on a national level. Since
each species is essential to biodiversity, the loss of one species could
substantially affect interstate commerce through its negative impact
on ecosystems.
b. Congress Comprehended That Preserving Biodiversity Would
Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce
As stated above, Congress protected individual species with the
intent of preserving broader biodiversity. The text of the ESA ex-
pressly states that Congress's purpose in passing the ESA is "to provide
185. Id.
186. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2001).
187. Id.; Mank, Protecting Intrastate Endangered Species, supra note 174, at 730.
188. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (2001); Mank, Protecting Intrastate Endangered Species,
supra note 174, at 940.
189. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978).
190. Congress generally balances economic costs with the environmental interest when
enacting a statute. See Thomas R. Mounteer, The Inherent Worthiness of the Struggle: The Emer-
gency of Mandatory Pollution Prevention Planning as an Environmental Regulatory Ethic, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 298 (1994).
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a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved." 191
Congress also recognized that protecting biodiversity would, in
turn, affect interstate commerce. The ESA House Report shows that
Congress was concerned with the actual and potential commercial
value of biodiversity.192 First, the text of the ESA provides that many
endangered species are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, histori-
cal, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people."
193
Although it could be argued that value may refer to a more intrinsic
value, Congress contemplated and focused on the economic value of
biodiversity. 194 Furthermore, a broad definition of the term of "eco-
nomics" would surely include the protection of species as a form of
resource allocation.1 95 Second, the House Report provides that if we
do not protect biodiversity, we endanger the genetic heritage of the
threatened species', as well as our own. 196 This genetic heritage has an
incalculable value because it may contain endless possibilities for cures
for cancer or other diseases, present or future.1 97 Additionally healthy
ecosystems affect the economy through ecosystem services: renewing
soil, mitigating floods, decomposing organic material, purifying air
and water, and partially stabilizing climatic variations.' 98
Alternatively, Congress understood that the ESA would prevent
commercial development that destroys listed species, thus having a
negative substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress indi-
cated that untempered economic growth and development was a pri-
191. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2001); NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Henderson, J., concurring).
192. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1050-52 (discussing that the ESA's legislative history shows
an emphasis on the future economic and medical benefits); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,
496-97 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endan-
gered Species Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated
Activity is Private Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BRooY_ L. REv.
923, 938 (2004) [hereinafter Mank, Split in the Circuits]; John Copeland Nagle, The Com-
merce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REv. 174, 193 & n.76 (1998).
193. 16 U.S.C. §1531(a)(3) (2001) (emphasis added).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). For example, biodiversity creates "eco-
nomic" value by providing the pharmaceutical and tourism industries with essential re-
sources. Consequently, these industries funnel billions of dollars into interstate commerce.
NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-53; MILLER, supra note 115, at 74; WAT rS ET AL., supra note 108, at
191-92.
195. See POSNER, supra note 161, at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.; MILLER, supra note 115, at 74.
198. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003); see also
Kunich, supra note 150, at 1164-65 (discussing the role of many commercially insignificant
species in achieving ecosystem survival).
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mary cause of species extinction. 199 The text of the Act explains that
"various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and de-
velopment untempered by adequate concern for conservation." 20 0
c. Empirical Studies Confirm That the ESA Actually Affects
Interstate Commerce
As Congress comprehended, preserving biodiversity positively im-
pacts interstate commerce by providing valuable resources, as well as
by contributing to the availability of ecosystem services. A rich variety
of genes, species, and biological communities provide our economy
with food, wood, fibers, energy, raw material, industrial chemicals,
and medicines. 20 1 For example, a species' genetic information not
only allows it to adapt to changing environmental conditions but is
also used in genetic engineering to produce new types of crops, foods,
and pharmaceuticals. 20 2 These contributions funnel billions of dollars
into the world economy each year. 20 3 Furthermore, eco-tourism gen-
erates at least $500 billion per year worldwide. 20 4
Empirical evidence supports these contentions and shows that
the ESA actually affects the national economy. In fact, an empirical
study performed by a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy indicates that the listing of a species under the ESA may have a
positive impact on the agricultural sector's performance. 20 5 Further-
more, another empirical study indicates that the critical habitat desig-
nation under the ESA may enhance recreational activities and
economic development in other areas through the reallocation of
water resources.20 6 Finally, the impacts of the ESA are typically re-
gional, rather than local, and thus affect interstate commerce. 20 7
199. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2001); Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 192, at 938.
200. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a)(1); Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 192, at 938; Nagle,
supra note 192, at 193.
201. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (quoting Myrl L. Duncan,
Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History
in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1129 (1996)); MILLER, supra note 115, at 74; STEPHEN
M. MEYER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ON THE AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR, MIT PROJECT ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS & POLICY 2 (Oct. 1995).
202. MILLER, supra note 115, at 454.
203. Id. at 74.
204. Id. at 454.
205. See MEYER, supra note 201, at 2.
206. WATrS ET AL., supra note 108, at 2-3.
207. Id. at 25.
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Additionally, preserving biodiversity facilitates the availability of
crucial ecosystem services. Healthy ecosystems renew soil, mitigate
floods, decompose organic material, purify air and water, and partially
stabilize climatic variations. 20 8 Furthermore, species diversity increases
ecosystem stability by providing more ways to respond to stresses.20 9
On the other hand, the designation of a habitat has negative sub-
stantial effects on interstate commerce by preventing commercial de-
velopments, the harvesting of trees, or the agricultural use of
streams.210  Either way, the ESA substantially affects interstate
commerce.
2. The Formalistic "Economic" Requirement May Cause Courts to
Miss the ESA's Substantial Effect on Interstate
Commerce
The ESA highlights Lopez-Morrison's analytic weaknesses. Specifi-
cally, the test is unable to effectively address a statute that regulates
"economic" and "non-economic" activity, but nevertheless has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. Indeed, the circuit courts' in-
consistent reasoning in constitutional challenges to the ESA
demonstrate that the Rehnquist Court has failed to successfully distin-
guish between regulations that affect interstate commerce and those
that do not. Recall the comprehensive purpose-defining the object
of the ESA as the loss of one species on the biodiversity and the result-
ing impact on interstate commerce. Under Lopez-Morrison, the com-
prehensive purpose approach lies on extremely shaky ground because
it aggregates "non-economic" activities (destroying cave species),
which the Lopez-Morrison framework may not allow. 211 Without the "es-
sential part of a larger regulation of economic activity" exception,
which the Court has never explicitly articulated, the cave species are
not "economic" in nature and are not fit for aggregation under Lopez-
Morrison.212
Yet stretching this exception to the ESA seems to obliterate the
limits of the Commerce Clause doctrine. Under this view the posses-
sion of guns or gender-based violence both seem to be essential to a
208. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (2003); see also Kunich, supra
note 150, at 1164-65 (discussing the role of many commercially insignificant species in
achieving ecosystem survival); Mank, Protecting Intrastate Endangered Species, supra note 174,
at 787; MILLER, supra note 115, at 74.
209. MILR, supra note 115, at 155.
210. WATrs ET AL., supra note 108, at 2.
211. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995); Mathews, supra note 2, at 951.
212. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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larger regulation that has some "economic" impact.213 The Supreme
Court is not likely to accept this approach, since it would force the
Court to confront and possibly overrule both the Lopez and Morrison
holdings. Perhaps this is why the Court denied certiorari for Rancho
Viejo. 214
As detailed above, however, the complicated connection between
modem economics and biodiversity elucidates that the ESA's compre-
hensive scheme does substantially affect interstate commerce. There-
fore, the "economic" requirement does not properly correlate to a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, nor must the Court extend
the "larger part of an economic regulation" exception in order to find
the ESA constitution.
The "economic" requirement also fails to properly correlate to
substantial effects on interstate commerce, as applied to the conduct
approach. Although this approach has a better chance of surviving a
Commerce Clause challenge, it does not provide comprehensive pro-
tection to listed endangered species, which is essential to the success
of the ESA's national goal. When the ESA prevents commercial devel-
opment, it regulates an "economic" activity that, under Lopez-Morrison,
a court can aggregate.
There are several reasons that the conduct approach is inade-
quate. Initially, this approach contradicts the ESA's legislative history,
since it argues that the statute is essentially a regulation of commercial
development rather than of biodiversity. Furthermore, it has not been
unanimously accepted; the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected it and
SWANCC indicated disapproval of the approach.215 Most strikingly,
even if the conduct approach were accepted, it does not accomplish
the national goal of preserving biodiversity. It is arbitrary to allow Con-
gress to regulate species that are threatened from commercial devel-
opment, while not allowing Congress to regulate species that are
threatened by a lone hiker, off road vehicle, or homeowner.
In his Morrison dissent, Justice Breyer provides an example that
illustrates these arbitrary results. Justice Breyer writes, "[I] f chemical
emanations through indirect environmental change cause identical,
severe commercial harm outside the state, why should it matter
whether local factories or home fireplaces release them?"216 Similarly,
213. See Mathews, supra note 2, at 951.
214. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
215. See GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633; SWANCC v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
216. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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it is arbitrary to allow Congress to regulate endangered species that
are threatened by "economic" activity but not to allow Congress to
regulate species that are threatened by "non-economic" activities.
Both sets of species are equally important to the overall goal of pre-
serving biodiversity and have an equal affect upon interstate
commerce.
Finally, while the ESA may still be constitutional as applied to in-
terstate, "economic" species under the target approach, this limited
application would make the ESA completely ineffectual. Most of the
species that the ESA must regulate to preserve biodiversity would not
satisfy the "economic" requirement of the Lopez-Morrison analysis. Also,
this would create illogical results in that Congress would be able to
regulate species when they are abundant and spread across state lines
but not when the species are so depleted as to exist in only one state.
The depleted species are closer to extinction and therefore more im-
portant to the comprehensive purpose of preserving biodiversity.
11. The Lopez-Morrison Framework Cannot Be Fixed: The
More the Court Tries to Make the Test Workable,
the Less it Would Correlate to Interstate
Commerce
As detailed above, Lopez-Morrison has not effectively avoided the
analytical difficulties that doomed the "direct"/"indirect" effects test.
Moreover, any attempt to define precisely the proper object of the
regulation or the Rehnquist Court's definition of the word "eco-
nomic" would drive the Court's Commerce Clause doctrine further
into formalism, creating more imprecise categorical exemptions. In-
deed, creating more categorical exemptions to combat the current
confusion would simply make the Lopez-Morrison analysis even less ca-
pable of correlating to an effect on interstate commerce.
A. Categorical Exemptions Create Arbitrary Results
Categorical exemptions result in legal uncertainty. 217 Indeed, the
Lopez Court conceded this point, stating that "a determination
whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in
some cases result in legal uncertainty. '" 218 Furthermore, Justice
Breyer's dissent in Morrison warned that the unworkability of the cate-
217. Lopez 514 U.S. at 610.
218. Id.
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gorical distinction is not due to any jurisprudential defect but rather a
practical reality.21 9 Justice Breyer wrote:
We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific,
technological, commercial, and environmental changes. Those
changes taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity,
no matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its condi-
tions, outside the State-at least when considered in the
aggregate.2 20
Jurisprudence without considering a statute's overall purpose cre-
ates incomprehensible results. 2 21 The Rehnquist Court uses the pre-
cise definition of "economic" in an attempt to limit the Commerce
Clause to interstate commerce at the expense of an understanding of
why this distinction would accomplish that goal. As Lon Fuller writes,
"[s] urely the judicial process is something more than a cataloguing
procedure." 222 Fuller purports that interpretive problems should
never turn on a single word because ajudge has a larger responsibility
in interpreting a case. 22 3 The difficulties of the lower courts in deter-
mining the proper object of the regulation demonstrate the un-
workability of the "economic" distinction
B. Choosing the Proper Object of the Regulation: More
Incoherence and Less Correlation to the Commerce
Clause's Purpose
Defining the proper object of the regulation would not cure this
defect but instead would take the Court further away from properly
determining when a statute actually affects interstate commerce. If the
Court simply chose the proper object of the ESA, the scope of that
object would remain unclear. Furthermore, viewing the potential ef-
fects of one object on interstate commerce would not capture the
Act's true economic impacts.
1. If the Court Chose the Proper Object of the Regulation, the
Scope of that Object Would Remain Unclear
If the Court assigned the individual species as the proper object
of the regulation, the extent of the species' proper aggregation to
show a substantial effect on interstate commerce would remain un-
219. Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630, 666 (1958).
223. Id.
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clear. For example, it is unclear whether the effects of the loss of all
red wolves could be aggregated in Gibbs.22 4 On the other hand, if the
Court assigned the conduct as the proper object of the species, the
proper scope of this conduct would also be unclear. Would it simply
include the development threatening the species, or would it incorpo-
rate the interstate transfer of labor and supplies? 225 An even broader
view of conduct would include the race to the bottom
phenomenon. 226
Finally, even if the Court accepts the comprehensive purpose as
the object of the regulation, more questions would ensue. Can that
species be aggregated with all endangered species. 227 Furthermore,
the essential part of a larger economic regulation is difficult to use.
For example, when is the regulation of an object "essential" to a com-
prehensive purpose? Also, when is an overall purpose "economic?"
Does an "economic" purpose have to be Congress's motivating factor,
or can it be one of many goals? Thus, solving the confusion with at-
tempts to venture further into formalism would not make the Lopez-
Morrison test more workable.
2. Limiting the Analysis to One Object Would Not Capture the
True Effects on Interstate Commerce
As demonstrated in Part IIB, choosing the proper object of the
regulation would make the Lopez-Morrison analysis less likely to corre-
late to any real effects on interstate commerce. The individual species
approach would only capture the interstate commerce effects of "eco-
nomic" species, such as the red wolf. This would miss the effects on
interstate commerce of the more critically endangered species that
cannot be defined as "economic." Ironically, these species may be
more important to the critical balance of ecosystems. 228 The conduct
approach does not capture a species' impact on the national economy
when it is threatened by "non-economic" activities. Finally, the com-
prehensive approach captures the true impacts of the ESA on inter-
224. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 493 (4th Cir. 2000) (allowing the aggregation of
red wolves because red wolves are "economic").
225. See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing
the aggregation of the development because it is "economic").
226. NAHB v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
227. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 638 (5th Cir. 2003) (not allowing
aggregation of all listed species); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052 (allowing the aggregation of all
listed species).
228. The depleted species are closer to extinction and therefore more important to the
comprehensive purpose of preserving biodiversity.
[Vol. 39
COMMERCE CLAUSE
state commerce but would force the Court to overrule Lopez and
Morrison.
Conclusion
The Lopez-Morrison analysis fails to accomplish its own goals be-
cause it creates incoherent results and cannot comprehend real and
intuitive connections between modern interstate commerce and bi-
odiversity. Indeed, the dollar value of a particular species has abso-
lutely no relationship to its biological value. The "economic" value of
the species does not determine the degree to which the food web, and
therefore its habitat, depends upon a particular species' survival. Most
importantly, the "economic" value of the species does not account for
the degree to which that habitat, which is dependant upon the sur-
vival of non-economic species, affects interstate commerce. It is this
biological value that Congress recognized as having an impact on in-
terstate commerce.
The Rehnquist Court's requirement that the species of the partic-
ular controversy be "economic" misses this intuitive connection. More-
over, in trying to reconcile the ESA with the overly literal Lopez-
Morrison test, circuit courts have gotten lost in a forest of confusion.
Most of this confusion has centered around the question of which reg-
ulated object needs to have an "economic" value: (1) Is it the conduct
that threatens the species; (2) is it the species of the particular contro-
versy; or (3) is it that species' effect on biodiversity? This question
cannot be resolved without adding more strands to the web of
confusion.
Perhaps the Supreme Court has denied certiorari for Commerce
Clause challenges to the ESA because it understands the serious
problems of this paradox. Upon reviewing such a case, the Court
would be forced to (1) hopelessly go deeper into the forest of formal-
ism, which would further decrease the ability of the Lopez-Morrison
analysis to limit the Commerce Clause to interstate commerce; (2)
overturn Lopez and Morrison; or (3) deny Congress the authority to
regulate a problem that has substantial effects on interstate com-
merce. The most viable option for the Court is to create a test that has
a bird's eye view of the forest-one that comprehends the complexi-
ties of modern interstate economics as well as the relationship be-
tween that economy and biodiversity.
If the true rationale of the Rehnquist Court is to distinguish be-
tween activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and those
that have no such effect, then the question should not be whether a
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particular species is "economic." Instead, courts must focus on
whether the environmental regulation as a whole, specifically the pres-
ervation of ecosystems, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Thus, if the Supreme Court considers a Commerce Clause challenge
to the ESA, it should take heed of the Lopez and Morrison dissents of
Justice Breyer and Justice Souter and abandon its failed experiment.
